Conservative Christian groups in Britain have been involved in a number of high profile and controversial policy issues. Scholarly research into the political activities of such groups, however, remains limited. This article addresses this lacuna by exploring the collective action frames deployed by conservative Christian groups in their attempts to influence national level policies and debates. Drawing on elite interviews with group representatives, it argues that these frames have been constructed largely in response to the pressures of secularisation, but have, in many respects, become secularised themselves.
Introduction
In recent years conservative Christian groups in Britain have been involved in a number of high profile and controversial issues. Notable flashpoints have included disputes around free speech, abortion, assisted dying, same-sex marriage, the regulation of medical technologies, religious freedom and equalities legislation. Notwithstanding a number of studies into the historical, sociological and anthropological qualities of conservative forms of Christianity in Britain (e.g. Bebbington, 1989; Wolffe, 1995; Thompson, 2009; Bebbington and Jones, 2013; Strhan, 2015 Strhan, , 2016 , scholarly research into the political activities of conservative Christian groups has been relatively limited. In addition, the small number of analyses have tended to focus on a select number of issues, typically centring on the debate around an emergent British 'Christian Right' comparable to the movement that developed in the United States from the 1970s (e.g. Walton et al, 2013) , and the approach taken by conservative Christian groups to 'moral issues' such as homosexuality and abortion (e.g. see Durham, 2005; Burack and Wilson, 2009; Hunt, 2010 Hunt, , 2014 .
In one respect this lack of scholarly attention is understandable. Conservative Christian groups attempting to shape developments at a national level are relatively few in number and are usually considered to exert little cultural or political influence (Walton et al, 2013 ). Yet the engagement of such groups with high-profile affairs demonstrates a significant commitment to activism, and their potential influence cannot be wholly discounted -not least given the substantial size of the conservative (or conservative-leaning) Christian population.
For these reasons the political activities of conservative Christian groups remains a worthwhile topic for analysis.
This article contributes to scholarship in this area by exploring the collective action frames that are deployed by Britain's main conservative Christian organisations. Collective action frames are an essential part of the way in which groups and movements seek to effect political, social and/or cultural change, providing a narrative designed to simplify and condense the core elements of the world in which they are operating, as well as encapsulate their shared beliefs and values in an easily understandable way. In this respect a collective action frame has multiple, interrelated objectives: to identify key problems and adversaries, to highlight grievances and injustices, to consolidate and reaffirm group cohesion and solidarity, to propose an agenda for change, and to legitimise objectives and mobilise actors to pursue them. In short, a collective action frame seeks to advance the interests of the group while simultaneously undermining the claims and efforts of their opponents (see Benford and Snow, 2000; Polletta and Jasper, 2001; Rohlinger and Quadagno, 2009; Graham, 2013) .
In order to be successful, a collective action frame must appeal to two distinct 'internal' and 'external' sets of audiences (generally breaking down into group and non-group members).
Messages primarily directed towards members of the group (such as statements made in newsletters or promotional appeals) must be pitched to strengthen or sustain cohesion and mobilisation, while messages principally targeted at those outside the group (such as general media interviews, the use of social media or public statements about values, goals and policy) need to be tailored to persuade and possibly recruit others to the cause. While the division between these two orientations is not always clear-cut (media statements can also be used to signal a position to an internal audience, for instance), the bifurcation raises important strategic considerations (on these points see Gamson, 1997) .
The process by which a collective action frame is constructed and deployed is shaped by a number of factors. These include: the ability of the group to mobilise resources (such as money, manpower and positive media coverage), its relationships to political opportunity structures (including state institutions, political parties and relevant policy networks), as well as the impact of wider sociocultural variables (such as perceptions of legitimacy, cultural norms and general public attitudes). The role of internal tensions and debates around goals and strategies are important here as well. Collective action frames are the outcome of negotiated processes in which disputes over goals and strategy may emerge. The possibility for intra-group conflict is all the more pressing in a context in which the aims and values of a group diverge from those of the wider society they wish to influence, with potential strains between a desire for ideological purity and pragmatism making a successful frame all the more difficult to achieve (Benford and Snow, 2000; Polletta and Jasper, 2001; Lichterman, 1999 Lichterman, , 2008 .
This dilemma has been all the more pronounced in the case of conservative Christian groups by the growing pressures of secularisation. With religion in Britain declining across all key measures of religiosity, conservative groups have increasingly turned to the use of collective action frames based on overtly secular norms and values rather than theological assertions.
While this may be a strategic imperative for engaging with a largely secular society, the implications are potentially significant, raising the prospect of schisms as well as a loss of control over the direction of narrative structures themselves.
The empirical research for this study is primarily drawn from a series of eight semi-structured interviews with elite level representatives from conservative Christian groups seeking to effect change at the national level. Although there is no authoritative view on which conservative Christian groups might be the most important in terms of influencing national politics in Britain, a number of organisations attract consistent attention within the scholarly literature and commentary on the subject. These groups typically include: the Christian These groups were all approached to take part in the study, and the subsequent interviews were conducted under conditions of anonymity. Five of the interviewees were directly responsible for leading their organisation, and all were involved at a senior operational and decision-making level.
1 These interviews were supplemented by a qualitative analysis of media reports and public statements from conservative Christian groups, and by a series of interviews with representatives from more mainstream religious organisations. Although the number of interviewees involved in the main sample is relatively small, and while due care must therefore be taken when attempting to generalise from their responses -the composition of the main sample was also predominantly male and white as well as being largely Londoncentric -the primary interviews cover the majority of key national level conservative
Christian groups in Britain, and provide a valuable insight into critical aspects of their worldview.
Conservative Christianity in Britain
The most influential conservative Christian groups in Britain derive predominantly from the Alliance, 2015) .
This emphasis on moral themes is strongly shaped by theological influences. The largest survey of evangelical opinion in Britain (also conducted by the Evangelical Alliance), involving a poll of over 17,000 people -more than 15,000 of whom self-identified as evangelical -found that 96% of respondents claimed to attend church at least once a week, 91% strongly believed that Jesus was the only way to god and 88% strongly agreed that their faith was the most important thing in their lives. Traditional and conservative views were also significant, with almost two-fifths (37%) of respondents professing a belief in hell and around a fifth maintaining that Christianity and evolution were incompatible (Evangelical Alliance, 2011).
Aims and activities
The political activities of conservative Christian groups are primarily directed towards two kinds of audiences. The former of these (what might be termed 'inward-facing') activities are tailored towards members of the group and like-minded constituencies, and are designed to address issues and concerns that are specific to the group itself, or to its own sectional area of In advancing these aims conservative Christian groups do not function as a cohesive and coordinated bloc or movement. On a general day-to-day level the main organisations do not engage with each other in a systematic co-operative way, and this lack of co-ordination (bordering in some cases on mutual antipathy) was also highlighted by interviewees. proportion self-identifying as having 'no religion' rose from 31% to 48.9%. These findings are supported by a raft of additional studies and surveys suggesting that secularising trends continue to run through every indicator of religiosity, from decline at the level of beliefs, attendance and membership, to a loss of religious authority expressed in diminishing trust and confidence in both church and clergy (see e.g. Bruce, 2013; Field, 2014; Clements, 2015) .
A meta-analysis of opinion poll data (taken from 123 national and 35 local surveys) has In 2010 almost three quarters (72%) of evangelical churchgoers claimed that the Bible was without error. In 2011 83% of evangelicals claimed that the Bible was the supreme authority guiding their beliefs, opinions and behaviours (see Field, 2014) .
These dynamics present conservative Christian groups with a two-pronged dilemma:
imposing strategic pressures to position themselves within what is now an increasingly secularised external environment, but to fashion this appeal in such a way that it sustains a sense of internal cohesion and mobilisation amongst group members. The principal response to this -which has emerged in an un-planned and un-coordinated fashion -has been the deployment of a collective action frame built upon two primary assertions: first, that secularisation poses a serious threat to the social and moral probity of the nation, and second, that it represents a growing danger to religious freedoms. This approach, which draws on the salience of identity politics and a language of minority rights, contains strong similarities to (and, indeed, may well have been influenced by) the political strategy adopted by the Christian Right in the United States (on this see Jelen, 2005; Klemp, 2010; Thomas and Olson, 2012) . 5 The first of these themes pulls together a number of interrelated points, maintaining that the decline of Christianity in Britain has led to a loss of social cohesion, the rise of a crude Christians are discriminated against in the public square … you've got a hundred years of a secular experiment that's gone all wobbly all over the place and people see religion as a threat to their power, to their influence and their world view (interview #3).
Another representative, making the same point, claims that: 'secularists want to drive religion out of the public sphere, to leave the field clear for them', and are 'creating a spiritual vacuum … that Islam is waiting to fill' (interview #7). From a similar vantage point is the argument that the marginalisation of Christians has been driven by 'an aggressive secularism that claims to be value neutral', but in reality represents 'an attempt to rid Western civilisation of Judeo-Christian values … it's reminiscent, really, of the Soviet state, and it's a complete denial of an individual or groups' right to be able to express themselves freely'
(interview #8). Another interviewee asserts, just as vigorously, that 'the whole equalities agenda' has led directly to 'oppression and censorship' to the extent that anyone disagreeing is 'cut out of the public space' (interview #5). This emphasis on religious rights and freedoms has become increasingly prominent during the last decade. The shift in focus is illustrated by an analysis of press releases from the Christian Institute, one of the most well-known and publicly active conservative Christian groups in Britain, as well as being one of the few to make their archive publicly available.
From 1996 to 2000 the issue of religious liberty featured in just 9.8% of all press releases (from a total of 61), with the primary issues of concern centring on homosexuality (featuring in 44% of all items), education (21%) and marriage (16%). Assertions about the marginalisation of Christianity often place the blame for this on the actions of the government as well as churches themselves. Alongside the introduction of equalities legislation under the administrations of New Labour, some of the most significant complaints in this regard are directed at the Coalition government for the legalisation of same-sex marriage and a failure to follow through on promises to allow a greater public role for faith-based organisations under the Big Society agenda. As one interviewee puts it, the government's approach was 'quite religiously illiterate in different ways, and even hostile' (interview #3), while another maintains that: 'the problem is what the government has wanted is the benefit that the Christian organisations bring in particular -which is loads of good social work on the ground -but you try and put Jesus in or prayer in, the thing that actually changes lives', and the real attitude was 'don't give out the bibles, don't talk about Jesus'
(interview #5). The restrictive impact of equality and diversity measures is also highlighted, with one interviewee claiming that this has meant that 'the ability for the church to serve is then strangled' (interview #2). Another makes the point more forcefully, accusing the government of having 'abused religious people'. As they complain, the government's approach is 'an attempt to, on the one hand, say that religions are important, and on the other hand to completely emasculate them in terms of any effectiveness in society' (interview #8).
Criticism Christians would just get over it and it wouldn't be a big deal'. In their view, the actual result had been nothing short of 'a political disaster'. As they explain:
we've upset our traditional supporters by pressing ahead with it … we've sent a terrible signal, if you like, to gay people by the majority of Conservative MPs being against it, so you've got a lose lose. It was an absolutely ridiculous thing to do (interview #4).
Alongside this, the role of the church in the marginalisation of religion is said to reside in its own wilful, and decades long abandonment of the public sphere. One representative claims that their organisation 'would not need to exist if the church of England had spoken with a clear voice', and laments that many of the problems associated with secularisation have emerged as a result of 'the church failing to take her place, others vying loud in the public space' (interview #5). Supporting this view, another interviewee notes that 'a number of other organisations' (notably Muslim and homosexual rights groups) have been 'very active and very strong when it comes to lobbying … there is a tide that's turning, and unless the church stands up and speaks, we won't be entitled to hold that position in the public sphere'
(interview #2). Highlighting the lack of engagement from Christians themselves, one respondent expresses a desire to see 'Christ's church militant here on earth' and for
Christians to become more politically organised, 'getting out on to the streets and being active in the public sphere, getting elected, all these sorts of things' (interview #7).
The limits of frames
A collective action frame based on the dangers of secularisation and the marginalisation of Christianity serves as a useful agent of cohesion for conservative Christian groups, fostering a sense of shared grievance and providing a motivational spur to action. At the same time, however, a central (and to some extent, paradoxical) feature of this narrative is its overtly secular character. While the beliefs and activities of conservative Christian groups are driven by theological concerns (e.g. Ysseldyk et al, 2010) , and while 'inward-facing' activities directed at group members may well give prominence to these theological motivations (Klemp, 2010) , the 'outward-facing' arguments that are deployed with a view to shaping wider sociocultural attitudes and issues of public policy are overwhelmingly framed in terms of secular norms and values. Arguments around the issue of abortion, for example, are often based on improving survival rates for premature births (typically drawing on data from EPICure), advances in medical technologies are frequently opposed on 'slippery slope' grounds involving the unpredictable social consequences (such as the rise of an instrumentalist view of humanity, the creation of designer babies and the risks of using human/animal hybrid embryos), the case against assisted dying is founded on the implications for the most vulnerable groups in society (a common argument here being that elderly and disabled citizens will feel under pressure to turn to assisted suicide rather than live on as a 'burden' on their families), while opposition to the legalisation of same-sex marriage was based primarily on arguments relating to historical tradition, the lack of an electoral mandate, and the alleged social problems (such as rising levels of crime and family breakdown) that would result (for more on these issues see e.g. Kettell, 2009 Kettell, , 2013 Hunt 2014 ).
The adoption of a collective action frame based on a language of minority rights and secular norms may appear to be somewhat unusual given that Christianity remains the single largest religion in Britain and continues to enjoy a wide range of privileges at the level of politics and law (including an established church, representatives in the legislature, an extensive (and growing) role within the education system, and numerous tax and legal exemptions).
Research into the views of grassroots evangelical members is suggestive of a potential discrepancy too, with many lay evangelicals expressing a preference for identity markers based on notions of 'distinctiveness' rather than 'marginalisation' (Strhan, 2015 (Strhan, , 2016 .
One explanation for the construction and deployment of a collective action frame emphasising minority rights and marginalisation is that it reflects a pragmatic response by organisational elites to a changing legal environment (particularly the growth of equalities legislation from the middle of the previous decade) and a recognition of the fact that, in an increasingly secularised society, religious groups can only hope to influence wider opinion by avoiding narrative claims that are couched in overt theological terms and by instead utilising discourses that are connected to secular, liberal norms (e.g. see Jelen, 2010; Graham, 2013) .
Indeed, the benefits of using a form of 'strategic secularism' to promote theological issues by drawing on the tactics (language, methods and tools) of secular culture (Engelke, 2009 ) are well recognised by representatives of conservative Christian groups. Explaining the reasoning behind the use of secular rather than religious arguments by their own organisation, for instance, one interviewee notes that:
It's not because they don't have these convictions … it's because we live in a postChristian society, so if I use Christian arguments most people are not going to be persuaded by them … you've got to use the language that people connect with … if I'm talking to a Christian audience, then I'll couch it in different ways (interview #1).
On the same theme, another respondent states that the choice of 'when to use explicit religious arguments and language in public life' is 'a big issue' for their organisation, and maintains that while it is impossible to 'separate the theology out from public discourse', the danger of giving a green light to the use of theological arguments was that they 'could end up with all sorts of stuff' that could be politically disadvantageous. Thus, as they put it:
There's a time and a place for it … 99% of your Christian discourse is going to be implicit rather than explicit in that context, so you've got to be sensible about this, I think, because it plays into the hands of the secularists who just want to paint us as some sort of gung-ho (interview #3).
A related assertion here is that the use of secular arguments does not contradict theologically based claims, but, rather, that the two forms are complementary modes of reasoning and that the findings of science, and social scientific research, are supportive of the underlying theological position. Thus, as one respondent observes, on the specific issue of same-sex marriage:
It's not that we're dinosaurs or, you know, stick-in-the-muds, there is a truth about this that's critically important, there's nothing to do, you know, with preserving religious beliefs, it's everything to do with the way the world is made … all the evidence is that children in a secure mother-father family do best (interview #6).
The decision to use secular, as opposed to theological arguments, then, is:
Because what we're trying to do, what Christians in this are trying to do, is persuade … the majority, the people who are not swayed by religious arguments as such, that this particular view is right … the appeal is made on arguments that are common ground arguments, common good arguments, and they should be. If God is the creator, then what is good for the creation will be in harmony with what God says (interview #6).
Another interviewee sets out the same line of argument. As they put it: 'the kind of apologetics that I would offer around the position we take is not couched in a religious argument … in my view there is enough in science that would support the view that we take'.
The use of an overtly secular language, then, is not thought to be inauthentic or paradoxical because 'most religious groups realise that they have a particular take on reality which is not shared across the board', and because the findings of science and religion on issues such as the dangers of homosexuality and abortion are such that 'in terms of the scientific data … there's no need to appeal to the religious argument' (interview #8). Making the point too,
another representative argues that a successful defence of heterosexual marriage can be made on secular grounds because 'science shows and studies show that children do best when raised by a mother and a father', and because secular arguments are fully compatible with the religious view. As they put it: 'I think a lot of secular interfacing arguments were made because they can be made', and that 'I believe them from a faith perspective, from believing in the bible, but science and sociology and life backs it up, it always does … that's the truth'
(interview #5).
Success or failure?
The use of a collective action frame based around secular rather than theological arguments might provide conservative Christian groups with a useful means of appealing to a wider audience, but the evidence to date -as measured by policy progress on key campaign issuessuggests that the results have been somewhat mixed. On one hand, although the intractable problem of disentangling variables of cause and effect make it virtually impossible to ascertain the extent to which any practical influence on public policy issues can be attributed to the particular actions of conservative Christian groups (Chong and Druckman, 2007) , some areas of campaign success can be highlighted. Amongst these include: the rejection of the York (Stuart and Ahmed, 2012 ' (24 December, 2015) .
[ Table 2 about here]
Evidence also suggests that a collective action frame based on the marginalisation of Almost three quarters of the organisations giving evidence to the inquiry (a total of 22 out of 30 respondents) cited 'religious freedom' as a significant issue, some way ahead of the second and third placed issues of 'family' (being cited by 46% of respondents), and 'life issues' and 'charity' (with 30% each). A majority of respondents to the inquiry (56%) also said that Christians in Britain were being marginalised, and 50% maintained that they were being 'discriminated against' (figures calculated from Christians in Parliament, 2012).
All the same, the potential success of conservative Christian groups is outweighed by their evident failures. One issue here has been a notable lack of campaign success in key areas such as securing a reduction in the time limit for abortion, preventing the legalisation of same-sex marriage and the repeated loss of legal challenges brought on issues of employment discrimination. Another problem is that, while the size of the conservative (evangelical) population in Britain is far from insignificant, the lack of positive engagement with a frame of 'marginalisation' by many grass-roots evangelicals raises the possibility of future tensions and discontent with the collective action frame being deployed by group elites (see Strhan, 2015 Strhan, , 2016 . In a similar fashion, divisions and disagreements between conservative
Christian groups also threatens to undermine any sense of wider cohesion, with active cooperation between organisations being limited to specific high-profile campaigns.
A potentially more significant problem, however, derives from the use of a secularised discourse itself. One issue here is that assertions of marginalisation, and related claims that supporters of conservative Christian views need to be accorded the same rights and equalities as other social interests, serve to highlight the sectional character of religious claims, undermining calls for special treatment and the justification of political and legal privileges. This is particularly so when these assertions are out-of-step with the majority of British public opinion (as is the case on critical issues such as abortion, assisted suicide and same-sex marriage) and where these privileges can themselves be seen as traducing the rights of other minority groups (e.g. see Clements, 2015) .
While research from the United States indicates that the use of collective action frames based on notions of rights may have a positive rather than a negative impact -an educative and liberalising effect that promotes ideals of universal rights and levels of tolerance towards outgroups (e.g. Djupe et al, 2016; Lewis, 2016) , others indicate that the polarising discourse of the Christian Right has had a detrimental effect on democratic civility and deliberation (e.g.
see Klemp, 2010) and highlight the schismatic effects of promoting strong and reified religious identities (Bruce, 1994) . Importantly, the extent to which findings based on the Another potential problem with using collective action frames based on secular arguments is that this can reduce the amount of control that religious groups have over the direction of their own narrative claims and structures. In contrast to the use of theological arguments, about which religious groups can claim to have particular expertise, attempting to legitimise public policy arguments on secular terms (and particularly when these are legitimised on the basis of scientific evidence) can expose groups to unexpected shifts in the evidence base that can challenge and undermine the core assertions being made. If same-sex marriage does not lead to growing social problems, for example, or if the legalisation of assisted dying did not lead to a rising number of deaths amongst vulnerable groups in the way that conservative
Christians contend, then the credibility of the arguments being deployed to oppose such policies would be severely (and perhaps fatally) compromised. At the same time, such a situation would heighten the risk of internal splits and fissures between group members committed to retaining a secular outward-facing logic -with the implication being that they would now need to support a position to which they were previously opposed (such as accepting same-sex marriage) -and those wishing to remain theologically 'authentic' (on these issues see Knutsen, 2011; Thomas and Olson, 2012; Thomas, 2013) .
Conclusion
Conservative Christian groups in Britain are organisationally diverse and politically engaged on a variety of issues, but are confronted by similar challenges brought about by the on-going process of secularisation. This poses a strategic dilemma between balancing the need for groups to position themselves within an increasingly secularised context, while at the same time maintain a sense of distinctiveness and internal cohesion. The common response to this has been the construction of a collective action frame based on the ostensible social problems of secularisation and the threat posed to religious rights and freedoms. These assertions may be useful for providing group solidarity, but significant problems remain. The most serious of these pertain to the dynamics of a collective action frame based on secular norms and values, the long-term effects of which are unlikely to provide the kind of benefits that conservative
Christian groups would like to see. Further research into the political behaviour of conservative Christian groups should work towards unpacking these dynamics in more detail. 
